The issue I propose to examine is whether, or in what circumstances, the statistical approach to the assessment of curative measures is legitimate. This issue is straightforward, since, unless the mere enumeration of cases is regarded as a statistical procedure, the distinction between the statistical and the non-statistical approach to a problem is absolute; an investigator must inevitably be aware that he is making a clearcut and significant decision when he choses to adopt one method rather than the other.
The conclusion I shall draw is that in therapeutics -and analogously in other branches of inquirythe method of statistical experimentation is largely invalid. This is not to say that the accumulation of statistical material in medicine, or in other fields, is futile, or that the analysis of such material may not provide valuable guidance for the research worker and essential information for the administrator. It is merely to assert that the statistical experiment is not a satisfactory exploratory tool in the hands of the research worker confronted with a specific problem.
We can, I believe, arrive at this conclusion in two ways. Either we may identify ourselves with the experimentalist, who is seeking from the laboratory or clinic to promote a rational basis for therapeutics, and argue that the use of the statistical method is incompatible with the way of thought which ordinarily governs the activity of the scientist. Or, adopting the viewpoint of the mathematician or logician, we may argue that existing theories of statistical inference are inadequately grounded, and that until this matter is rectified we cannot help but accede to any objection on extra-logical grounds which is made to the use of the statistical techniques promoted by these theories; alternatively,-and this is the writer's own standpoint-we may feel ourselves able to argue in this capacity that a consistent theory is possible but that it does not elucidate the problems with which the physician or experimentalist is ultimately concerned.
We have therefore to consider two approaches to the question side by side; and if objections on general grounds to the statistical method are admissible, we must take it that the confusion which characterizes fundamental discussion of modern mathematical statistics will remain until the mathematical statistician is prepared to throw overboard so much that he abrogates in effect his right to advise on the logical structure of biological or other experimentation; on the other hand, if logical objections are valid, we must re-examine the position of statistical inference vis-a-vis general considerations in the philosophy of science.
Let us first consider objections which can be directed on general grounds against the use of statistical experimentation in medicine. Since, by reason of its simplicity and directness, the idea of a statistical approach to therapeutics very readily leaps to the mind, these have often been stated, and at different epochs. First, under the influence of Laplace, when Pierre Louis put forward his numerical method for medicine and pathology. Again, when the influence of Quetelet began to be felt in medicine; and later, in Great Britain, when Karl Pearson reintroduced and extended Quetelet's ideas. This last phase is the most interesting from the methodological point of view, since the prospect of unprecedented advances in prophylaxis and therapeutics disclosed by the contemporaneous rise of bacteriology reinforced the discussion with realistic anticipations. Opposition to Pearson's intrusion into the medical field came chiefly from Sir Almroth Wright as a serologist. The immediate point at issue related to Wright's proposals for anti-typhoid inoculation which Pearson publicly opposed on statistical grounds (Wright, 1904; Pearson, 1904 (Wright, 1912 (Wright, , 1921 (Wright, , 1953 (Colebrook, 1954) . This, however, is beside the point. Any advance in theoretical statistics can be of sufficiently radical importance to overturn Wright's main thesis, only if it involves a clarification of the disputed vocabulary of the subject. The majority of modern handbooks of statistical methodology contain no clearer definitions of such terms as random, probable, and significant than are implicit in Venn's "Logic of Chance", the first edition of which appeared in 1866. Judged by this criterion, progress has occurred in the mathematical but not in the logical structure of theoretical statistics. Whatever fundamental advance has been achieved does not obtrude into the practical handbooks.
The generalized statistical experiment may be treated formally as a sampling procedure in which balls are drawn haphazard from an urn in order to assess relations between the original proportions of different known types of ball within the urn (Wrighton, 1953 The only conclusion we can therefore draw from recent studies is that, on purely formal grounds, it is futile to attempt to develop a calculus ofjudgement or of decision. This is hardly compelling, since the plain man will have reached the same conclusion in the absence of intellectual effort. We are left with a line of development opened up by J. Neyman. To Neyman is due the notion of interval estimation by direct probabilities. This approach holds out more promise of success, since it suggests that we can hope to generate a class of statistical facts which can be viewed on almost equal terms, and therefore in effect contesseratively, with related non-statistical facts. Here we have a complete break with tradition. The retrospective approach is seemingly abandoned and the unattainable goal of judgement is ignored. But Neyman seems to have regarded his notion as purely mathematical, and has attempted to use it, not to throw light upon the nature of statistical reasoning, but to develop a retrospective calculus which is almost conventional. R. A. Fisher pointed out very early that the resulting theory of confidence intervals falls down because it does not admit of consistent development and he himself advanced contemporaneously the theory of fiducial probability, which uses the same basic notion in an inverse calculus applicable, however, only in a limited number of ideal situations. These theories do no more than provide further examples of the futility of the analytical approach.
I have put forward elsewhere (Wrighton, 1953) what I believe to be the correct explanation of the central paradox of the theory of confidence intervals and a suggestion with respect to its resolution in the context of the therapeutic trial. If we try to resolve the paradox on these terms we deduce a prospective calculus, and are led to an approach to statistical
